"No one knows what it means, but most believers have an opinion about it".
The concept of military transformation is linked with the idea of a "revolution in military affairs" (as opposed to the current regime of "equipment-orientated evolution").
Military transformation is "the set of activities by which a government (here I refer to the highest organizational element in the defence services hierarchy) attempts to align its military capabilities with its strategic intent giving rise to fundamental changes in the military's technology, operational concepts and doctrine, and organizational structure." One fundamental attribute in this process is the time needed to articulate strategic intent and thereby, strategic posture.
This process, even in a time of rapid changes in the geostrategic environment, takes years to articulate besides evolving almost continuously. And ideally, military capabilities, with its long gestation periods, have to evolve commensurately . However, this would be counter productive as it would destabilize perspective planning and the economics of procurement. Therefore , the military has to necessarily evolve capabilities towards a projected "end-state" using a perspective planning horizon of say, 30 years, with revolutionary "intermediate-state" objectives developed in say, 10-year planning buckets. Each of these 10-year planning buckets may be further sub-divided into multiple stages. Remember that we are not talking maintaining legacy (read existing) war-fighting capabilities through its normal asset cycles.
The process is intended to combine the acquisition of new military systems with appropriate changes to doctrine and organization with a view to maximize the capabilities of the armed forces to deal with emergent or future threats.
However, there is a problem here. And the problem is that the spectrum of conflict is expanding at both ends. On one hand, while the threat of conventional or nuclear war at the high intensity end of the spectrum is seeing rapid strides in technology and geographic reach, those at the low end of short engagements, low intensity conflicts, insurgency, counter-terror, aid to civil authorities, special operations, conflict prevention, confrontation management and international stability (or peace-keeing) operations are increasing in both in variety and frequency.
Given this scenario, how is the government expected to jump-start this process? Of course, no one is saying that the MoD, in its current form, is capable of taking on any leadership role in this regard. So it may well be left to the good offices of single-service chiefs to take the initiative.
One possible way is through experimentation using existing agencies!
As a matter of fact, such agencies are already in place, like for example, the Army's ARTRAC, conceived as the nodal agency for all institutional training in the Army.
There are six main imperatives: (1) stimulate indigenous private sector R&D investments for technology development, (2) assess and articulate the "intermediate-state" and "end-state" capability objectives in each plan, (3) test the acquired capability through war gaming, exercises and operational deployments, where emergent, (4) evolve and test joint capabilities for permanent integration into strategic and theatre commands, (5) integrate and militarize all intelligence capabilities, and (6) professionalize the MoD and the executive advisory functions.
While acquiring indigenous technological capabilities are again a long term goal, and given the nebulous nature of higher defence organization in India, single service chiefs can possibly initiate the process by adopting three immediate steps to stimulate the development of doctrine and organizational design, i.e., (1) invest in a variety of current off-the-shelf equipment in quantities suitable for attaining stage objectives and to seed indigenous R&D, (2) raise (through rationalization or re-appropriation) one or more experimental formations under their training commands to model stage capabilities (3) use project-based temporary structures to model and test joint doctrine and capability.
These future-state "incubators" will then serve as enablers for far-reaching changes in doctrine, concepts and organization, which together may well even generate fundamentally new ways of conducting military operations. This in turn will affect capital budgets and asset acquisition cycles, including many open and ongoing contracts and programs within the lifecycle of legacy assets. And at some critical point, the cumulative effects of technical advances and military innovation in all these areas will invalidate former conceptual structures and cause a fundamental alteration in accepted definitions and measurements of military effectiveness.
Such experimentation is not easy and in fact, has been even described as an "unnatural act" for any large, established organization. Moreover, these transformations do not come with any guarantees. Yet, it must be done right or at least, close to right, so that when the military is called to do something at some point in the future, it has the flexibility to adapt to its designated mission.
Single service experimental setup is feasible for all three services. Joint concepts and doctrines can be tested initially in experimental joint projects to gain trust and experience. Subsequently these temporary structures can be firmed up to create a fully integrated joint services experimental organization as a pre-cursor to joint theatre commands.
Any future force would have to be strategically responsive and dominant across a full spectrum of operations ranging from peacetime military engagement to smaller-scale contingencies to major theatre war. Given the rapidly changing geostrategic environment, strategic speed and lethality can no longer exist as separate variables.
All combat power is useless unless it can get to the specific theatre in time and maneuvre it tactically. Traditionally, heavy forces have had limited strategic mobility (read deployability) and light forces have had limited tactical utility. Any worthwhile transformation has to take care of this disconnect.
Of course, all this depends on the national policy concerning the future use of military force, which in the Indian context, has traditionally been passive, restrictive and poorly articulated. This decadence in military affairs, when combined with the lack of political leadership, the machinations of the civil bureaucracy and the dissonance created by other vested interests, has left a window of vulnerability in military capabilities, the true extent of which, luckily, has never been put to test.
The imperative of integrating the intelligence organizations derives from the expansion of conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum of operations. While operational capabilities remain prime, the burden shifts heavily to an effective intelligence framework.
Lastly, and of essential import to all other imperatives, is the pressing need to integrate and professionalize the MoD so that the transformation debate can mature from its focus on "equipment" to a holistic approach involving organizational, doctrinal and institutional change.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs by Dr David Jablonsky [Parameters, Autumn 1994]
.../-
The concept of military transformation is linked with the idea of a "revolution in military affairs" (as opposed to the current regime of "equipment-orientated evolution").
Military transformation is "the set of activities by which a government (here I refer to the highest organizational element in the defence services hierarchy) attempts to align its military capabilities with its strategic intent giving rise to fundamental changes in the military's technology, operational concepts and doctrine, and organizational structure." One fundamental attribute in this process is the time needed to articulate strategic intent and thereby, strategic posture.
This process, even in a time of rapid changes in the geostrategic environment, takes years to articulate besides evolving almost continuously. And ideally, military capabilities, with its long gestation periods, have to evolve commensurately . However, this would be counter productive as it would destabilize perspective planning and the economics of procurement. Therefore , the military has to necessarily evolve capabilities towards a projected "end-state" using a perspective planning horizon of say, 30 years, with revolutionary "intermediate-state" objectives developed in say, 10-year planning buckets. Each of these 10-year planning buckets may be further sub-divided into multiple stages. Remember that we are not talking maintaining legacy (read existing) war-fighting capabilities through its normal asset cycles.
The process is intended to combine the acquisition of new military systems with appropriate changes to doctrine and organization with a view to maximize the capabilities of the armed forces to deal with emergent or future threats.
However, there is a problem here. And the problem is that the spectrum of conflict is expanding at both ends. On one hand, while the threat of conventional or nuclear war at the high intensity end of the spectrum is seeing rapid strides in technology and geographic reach, those at the low end of short engagements, low intensity conflicts, insurgency, counter-terror, aid to civil authorities, special operations, conflict prevention, confrontation management and international stability (or peace-keeing) operations are increasing in both in variety and frequency.
Given this scenario, how is the government expected to jump-start this process? Of course, no one is saying that the MoD, in its current form, is capable of taking on any leadership role in this regard. So it may well be left to the good offices of single-service chiefs to take the initiative.
One possible way is through experimentation using existing agencies!
As a matter of fact, such agencies are already in place, like for example, the Army's ARTRAC, conceived as the nodal agency for all institutional training in the Army.
There are six main imperatives: (1) stimulate indigenous private sector R&D investments for technology development, (2) assess and articulate the "intermediate-state" and "end-state" capability objectives in each plan, (3) test the acquired capability through war gaming, exercises and operational deployments, where emergent, (4) evolve and test joint capabilities for permanent integration into strategic and theatre commands, (5) integrate and militarize all intelligence capabilities, and (6) professionalize the MoD and the executive advisory functions.
While acquiring indigenous technological capabilities are again a long term goal, and given the nebulous nature of higher defence organization in India, single service chiefs can possibly initiate the process by adopting three immediate steps to stimulate the development of doctrine and organizational design, i.e., (1) invest in a variety of current off-the-shelf equipment in quantities suitable for attaining stage objectives and to seed indigenous R&D, (2) raise (through rationalization or re-appropriation) one or more experimental formations under their training commands to model stage capabilities (3) use project-based temporary structures to model and test joint doctrine and capability.
These future-state "incubators" will then serve as enablers for far-reaching changes in doctrine, concepts and organization, which together may well even generate fundamentally new ways of conducting military operations. This in turn will affect capital budgets and asset acquisition cycles, including many open and ongoing contracts and programs within the lifecycle of legacy assets. And at some critical point, the cumulative effects of technical advances and military innovation in all these areas will invalidate former conceptual structures and cause a fundamental alteration in accepted definitions and measurements of military effectiveness.
Such experimentation is not easy and in fact, has been even described as an "unnatural act" for any large, established organization. Moreover, these transformations do not come with any guarantees. Yet, it must be done right or at least, close to right, so that when the military is called to do something at some point in the future, it has the flexibility to adapt to its designated mission.
Single service experimental setup is feasible for all three services. Joint concepts and doctrines can be tested initially in experimental joint projects to gain trust and experience. Subsequently these temporary structures can be firmed up to create a fully integrated joint services experimental organization as a pre-cursor to joint theatre commands.
Any future force would have to be strategically responsive and dominant across a full spectrum of operations ranging from peacetime military engagement to smaller-scale contingencies to major theatre war. Given the rapidly changing geostrategic environment, strategic speed and lethality can no longer exist as separate variables.
All combat power is useless unless it can get to the specific theatre in time and maneuvre it tactically. Traditionally, heavy forces have had limited strategic mobility (read deployability) and light forces have had limited tactical utility. Any worthwhile transformation has to take care of this disconnect.
Of course, all this depends on the national policy concerning the future use of military force, which in the Indian context, has traditionally been passive, restrictive and poorly articulated. This decadence in military affairs, when combined with the lack of political leadership, the machinations of the civil bureaucracy and the dissonance created by other vested interests, has left a window of vulnerability in military capabilities, the true extent of which, luckily, has never been put to test.
The imperative of integrating the intelligence organizations derives from the expansion of conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum of operations. While operational capabilities remain prime, the burden shifts heavily to an effective intelligence framework.
Lastly, and of essential import to all other imperatives, is the pressing need to integrate and professionalize the MoD so that the transformation debate can mature from its focus on "equipment" to a holistic approach involving organizational, doctrinal and institutional change.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs by Dr David Jablonsky [Parameters, Autumn 1994]
.../-
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