Strategy, Policy, Doctrine: Putting it together

Here is the picture so far:

Very simplistically, there are a set of issues that a nation faces at any time. The government machinery analyzes these issues and creates a policy response. "Policy" as we know, states  the principles or rules to guide decision making in order to achieve rational outcomes for the "greater good". All public policy, presumably, is utilitarian. Policy is also the baseline from which "protocol" or "procedure" is derived.

But where does policy come from?
It comes from strategy.

Note: Over the years, the term "strategy" has been so abused, that I have seen even very authoritative sources confused about whether policy comes before strategy. The confusion is probably due to the hierarchical nature of strategy, ie, it is applicable to multiple levels of structure. In that sense, policy at a higher level can be the principles or rules or the terms of reference within which lower level strategies may be defined.



And what is strategy?
A strategy is a statement of choice or intent, backed by the resources needed to acheive the desired end state within a given timeframe.

Strategy is also hierarchical, as the picture above demonstrates.

In the national context, the National Security Strategy is the first strategy to be formulated. Foreign relations or "external affairs" strategy, economic strategy, military security strategy, etc are derived from this capstone. As such, national security strategy should also define a "grand strategy" that is enduring.

And what about the concept of  "national interest"?
The "national interest" is a country's goals and ambitions whether economic, military or cultural. The national interest of a state is multi-faceted. Primary is the state's survival, welfare and security. Also important, is the pursuit of wealth, economic growth, power and influence. The preservation of a nation's culture could also be a national interest. National interests covers both domestic interests as well as the country's international or foreign interests.

Interestingly, in the politics of foreign relations, "national interest" is differentiated from "idealistic" policies that seek either to inject morality into foreign policy or promote solutions that rely on multilateral institutions which might weaken the independence of the state.

And where does "national interest" fit into our picture?

Obviously, "national interest" is taken into consideration when formulating national security strategy.

So what is doctrine?
Doctrine here is a representation of the current principles, positions or thinking in a specific domain. It is the belief system based on past experience in dealing with issues. It also provides commonly understood terminology and usage, and commonly understood ways of responding to well known issues. Sometimes it is just defined as "that which is taught". Doctrine can be looked at as a bridge between national security strategy and domain strategy. For example, a "military doctrine" would be the bridge between national security strategy and military security strategy.

What about goals?
A discussion on goals, or in the current context - "national goals" - would required addition of two more elements to our picture above.

If we have managed to get this picture right, we can now begin develop our discussion on implementation frameworks. Of course, I will spend more time and emphasis in the military security strategy domain.

Let me see whether this leads to any substantial insights.

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What is Policy?

Policy is an authoritative statement that provides direction, guidelines, and limitations intended to influence and determine decisions and actions, to include guidance for the developent of an implementing strategy, in pursuit of a desired end state.

In other words, a principle or rule to guide decisions and acheive rational outcomes.

 A policy is a guide to thinking and action for those responsible for making decisions. On the other hand, a strategy deals with the allocation and deployment of physical and human resources so as to achieve the desired goals in the face of environmental pressures.

A strategy may exist without a policy. Strategy and policy may in some cases be coextensive. A strategy deals primarily with environmental constraints and oppor­tunities whereas a policy is concerned mainly with internal management.

A policy is a contingent decision and it lays down the response to be made whenever the specified contingency arises. But a strategy is designed to deal with situations about which all facts are not known and, therefore, alternatives can not be evaluated in advance.

The implemen­tation of policy can be delegated but the execution of strategy cannot be delegated because it requires a last minute executive-decision.

However, both policy and strategy are designed to achieve organizational objectives. The process of their formulation is similar. In strategic decisions, the identification and analysis of the factors bearing on the problem are more difficult than in case of policy decisions.

Policy formulation generally goes through a series of stages. Very simplistically, these are: agenda setting, recognition of problem, consideration of options, agreement on most suitable option, legislation or introduction of new policy, and implementation.

 

Associated terms/phrases:

Policy window

Policy advocacy

Policy streams

Issue attention cycles

Policy think-tanks

Policy agenda

Policy objectives and priorities

Policy response

Policy analysis

Policy review

Review of Blog Objective

In "About this Blog" I had stated that I intend to explore the content and issues related to formulating a national security strategy and thereafter explore the linkages down through military strategy to domains like threat perceptions, force levels, manpower planning, capital budgeting and higher defence organization, drawing mainly from a wealth of information from older western democracies where (at least in a relative way) such evolved thinking permeates the government and having matured over the years has now been substantially articulated in documentation available in the public domain.

After a preliminary analysis of the documented national security strategy of the US and the UK, I have to admit that the strategic thought and the institutions tasked to formulate strategy have a long way to go in terms of learning. One can easily understand that as a country that believes in the old Soviet style centralized planning architecture of government (not withstanding the current centre-state ruckus on the federal structure of the constitution), it involves a steep learning curve.

Besides, think-tanks and advocacy groups established by former bureaucrats and retired veterans are part of the system and it will be a long call to expect any of them to display the kind of evolved thinking that is required to make the articulation of national security strategy a reality. Some of these think-tanks have realized this fact and have also realized that strategy research is more intensive and a longer term initiative than their flagging energies permit and have now begun to hire research assistants and full-time researchers as staff to do the preliminary legwork (or mousework, considering that most researchers are internet warriors today).

But what is stopping the government from hiring consultants from the industry as is the practice in  many western democracies including the US and the UK. In fact, both have articulated the need for closer interaction with the private sector talent in developing such capabilities.

Moving ahead, I intend to explore ways and means of categorising and linking elements of national security strategy to its desired outcomes and from there, to derive an integrated framework for formulating policy and in identifying initiatives. Of course, based on my own research, I intend to develop the discussion as planned or shift course, depending which alternative paths seem most promising.

National Security Strategy

National security strategy describes the strategic context within which a complex array of threats arise and how they may develop in the future. In general, it seeks to describe a nation's distinctive role in the emerging world order, the risks to security and the response to it along with a treatment of what methodology or framework was used to state quantitative measures of risk.

National Security Strategy can theoritically serve several distinct purposes:

• By offering prioritized objectives and indicating which elements of national power ("ways and means") are to be used to meet them, it can provide guidance to departments and agencies to use in their internal processes for budgeting, planning, executing and in organizing, training and equiping personnel
• By clearly linking goals and the approaches designed to meet them, national security strategy can provide the executive branch a key tool for justifying requested resources to parliament
• By laying out a detailed strategic vision, it can help inform the public audiences both at home and abroad about government intent

Let us take a look at the content of this document in a few leading western democracies.



BRITAIN

Britains national security strategy document [2010] for example is divided into 4 parts and a single annexure as under:

1. Part 1: The Strategic Context
2. Part 2: Britain's Distinctive Role
3. Part 3: Risks to our Security
4. Part 4: Our Response
5. Annex A: National Security Risk Assessment: Methodology

The foreword identifies the many sources of threats, defines Britains place in the world due to its political, economic and cultural authority and the possibilities thrown open through globalization and open markets. It defines the need to stand up and protect what it conceives to be its national interests and project its influence abroad through active engagement in world affairs and to stand up for its values to the extent of requiring to project power and use its unique network of alliances and relationships to retain a strategic presence wherever it is needed. It acknowledges that the defence and security structure that it has inherited is woefully unsuited for the world today and asserts the need to learn from past mistakes and make the changes required, primarily in five key areas:

1. Changes to Government to enhance prioritization and decision making in terms of structure and processes
2. Changes to allow the National Security Council develop a cohesive national security strategy that will allow the Government to make choices about the risks facing the nation
3. Changes needed in diplomatic missions worldwide to enable spotting emerging risks and dealing with them before they escalate into crises
4. Changes needed to build a closer relationship between government, private sector and the public on issues concerning national security
5. Changes to ensure that the Armed Forces exemplify the best qualities of the country and the people and that they are equipped and maintained for its critical global role

UNITED STATES

The Obama Administration released its first National Security Strategy on May 27, 2010. The overview of the report states:

"Our national security strategy is, therefore, focused on renewing American leadership so taht we can more effectively advance our interests in the 21st century. We will do so by building upon the soources of our strength at home, while shaping an international order that can meet the challenges of our time. This strategy recognizes the fundamental connection between our national security, our national competitiveness, resilience and moral example. And it reaffirms America's committment to pursue our interests through an international system in which all nations have certain rights and responsibilities."

The US National Security Strategy document is comprised of five parts:

1. A preamble by the President
2. Overview of National Security Strategy
3. Strategic Approach
1. The Strategic Environment - The World as It Is
2. The Strategic Approach - The World We Seek
3. Strengthening National Capacity - A Whole Government Approach
4. Advancing our Interests
1. Security
2. Prosperity
3. Values
4. International Order
5. Conclusion

In its concluding paragraph, the document states:

"This responsibility cannot be their [the Armed Forces] alone. And there is no question that we, as a nation, can meet our responsibility as Americans once more. Even in a world of enormous challenges, no threat is bigger than the American people's capacity to meet it, and no opportunity exceeds our reach. We will continue to draw strength from those founding documents that established the creed that binds us together. We, too, can demonstrate the capability and courage to pursue a more perfect union - and in doing so - renew American leadership in the world."



CRITICISM

To provoke more thinking on the subject, and before readers assume that this is the end state, it is constructive to read some of the immediate criticisms that the US National Security Strategy has evoked:

1. While the current administration has done an effective job of articulating US national goals and objectives through its many public "strategy" documents to the American public, these documents are not the result of serious efforts at strategic planning. There is minimal effort at assessing the spectrum of threats and opportunities endemic to the new post-9/11 security environment and at identifying priorities for policy development, execution and resource allocation.
2. An articulated national vision that describes America's purpose in the post-9/11 world is useful - indeed, it is vital - but describing a destination is no substitute for developing a comprehensive roadmap for how the country will acheive its stated goals.
3. Various institutons in America's national security apparatus have attempted strategic planning, but these efforts have been stove-piped within individual agencies and quite varied in approach and quality.
4. There is still no systematic effort at strategic planning for American national security that is wholly inclusive, deliberative and integrative. Demands for strategic transformation necessitate "structural reforms aimed at constructing a rooftop that integrates the several key strategic pillars (diplomatic, economic, military, etc) of American power and influence."

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. IDSA: A National Security Strategy for India [Gupta 2011]
2. A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy [Crown 2010]
3. US National Security Strategy [2010]
4. CRS Report for Congress [2008]
5. Decoding the Obama National Security Strategy [New America Foundation 2010]

National Security

National security is the requirement to maintain the survival of the state through the use of economic, diplomatic, military and political power.

Initially focused on military might, it now encompasses a broad range of facets, all of which impinge on the non military or economic security of the nation and the values it espouses.

Definitions
There is no single universally accepted definition of "National Security". The variety of definitions provide an overview of the many usages of this concept. The concept still remains ambigious, having originated from simpler definitions which intially emphasised the freedom from military threat and political coercion to later increase in sophistication and include other forms of non-military security as suited the circumstances of the time. Here are a few samples:

• Early: "the protection or the safety of a country's secrets and its citizens"
• 1943: "a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war"
• 1950: The distinctive meaning of national security means freedom from foreign dictation
• 1960: An ambigious symbol meaning different things to different people. National security objectively means the absence of threats to acquired values and subjectively, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked"
• 1977: "National security then is the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders."
• 1990: "National security...is bet described as the capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and well being"

As in the case of national power, the military aspect of security is an important, but not the sole, component of national security. To be truly secure, a nation needs other forms of security. Authorities differ in their choice of national security elements. Besides the military aspect of security, the aspects of diplomacy, or politics; society; environment; energy and natural resources; and economics are commonly listed. The elements of national security corelate closely to the concept of elements of national power.

It is interesting to note a dichotomy in the discussion on national security. The measures adopted to maintain national security in the face of threats to society has led to ongoing diaelectic, particularly in liberal democracies, on the appropriate scale and role of authority in matters of civil and human rights.

Tension exists between the preservation of the state and the rights and freedoms of individuals. Although national security measures are imposed to protect the society as a whole, many such measures will restrict the rights and freedoms of all individuals in society.

The concern is that where the exercise of national security laws and powers is not subject to good governance, the rule of law, and strict checks and balances, there is a risk that "national security" may simply serve as a pretext for suppressing unfavourable political and social views. Taken to its logical conclusion, this view contends that measures which may ostensibly serve a national security purpose could untimately lead to an Orwellian dystopia.



BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Wikipedia: National Security

Doctrine and Strategy

Doctrine is not strategy.

The NATO definition of strategy is "presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to acheive national objectives or those of a group of nations."

The official definition of strategy by the US DOD is : "Strategy is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to acheive national or multinational objectives."

Whereas, military doctrine has been universally defined as a "guide to action."

Military strategy provides the rationale for military operations. It was Field Marshall Alan Brooke who describes the art of military strategy most aptly as: "to derive from the aim [read policy] a series of military objectives to be acheived: to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the acheivement of each is likely to necessitate: to measure available and potential resources against the requirements and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action."

Doctrine, on the other hand, seeks to provide a common conceptual framework for a military service:

• what the service perceives itself to be ("Who are we?")
• what its mission is ("What do we do?")
• how the mission is to be carried out ("How do we do that?")
• how the mission has been carried out in history ("How did we do that in the past?")
• other questions

Doctrine reflects the judgements of professional military officers, and to a lesser but important extent civilian leaders, about what is and is not militarily possible and necessary.

Military Doctrine

I have been exploring military doctrines of a number of western democracy with a view to understanding the concept of doctrine and its relationship with strategy.

Firstly, what is military doctrine?

1. Military doctrine is the concise expression of how military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles and engagements.
2. It is a guide to action, not hard and fast rules.
3. A doctrine provides a common frame of reference across the military to help standardize operations and facilitate readiness by establishing common ways to accomplishing military tasks.
4. Doctrine is not a projection of military thinking into the future, it links theory, history, experience and practice.
5. Its objective is to foster initiative and creative thinking.
6. Doctrine provides the military an authoritative body of statements on how military forces conduct operations and provide a common lexicon for use by military leaders.

The NATO definition of doctrine is:

"Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative by requires judgement in application."

Canadian Army definition:

"Military doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of conflict, the preparation of the army for conflict, and the method of engaging in conflict to acheive success... it is descriptive rather than prescriptive, requiring judgement in application. It does not establish dogma or provide a checklist of procedures, but is rather an authoritative guide, describing how the army thinks about fighting, not how to fight. As such it attempts to be definitive enough to guide military activity, yet versatile enough to accomodate a wide variety of situations."

Soviet definition:
A doctrine is "a state's officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of the armed forces in them... Military doctrine has two aspects: social-political and military-technical. The social-political side encompasses all questions concerning methodology, economic and social bases, the political goals of war. It is the defining and the more stable side. The other side, the military-technical, must accord with the political goals. It includes the creation of military structure, technical equipping of the armed forces, their training, definition of forms and means of conducting operations and war as a whole."

British definition:
The doctrine is "a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgement and help him to avoid pitfalls...[doctrine] is meant to educate the mind of the future commander...not to accompany him to the battlefield." In setting out the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions, doctrine draws on the lessons of history, on original thinking and on experiences gained from training and operations.

The world over, militaries have defined doctrine in a hierarchy, with the top level doctrine being called the "capstone doctrine", on the basis of which single services could define single-service doctrines.

Imperatives of Military Transformation

"No one knows what it means, but most believers have an opinion about it".

The concept of military transformation is linked with the idea of a "revolution in military affairs" (as opposed to the current regime of "equipment-orientated evolution").

Military transformation is "the set of activities by which a government (here I refer to the highest organizational element in the defence services hierarchy) attempts to align its military capabilities with its strategic intent giving rise to fundamental changes in the military's technology, operational concepts and doctrine, and organizational structure." One fundamental attribute in this process is the time needed to articulate strategic intent and thereby, strategic posture.

This process, even in a time of rapid changes in the geostrategic environment, takes years to articulate besides evolving almost continuously. And ideally, military capabilities, with its long gestation periods, have to evolve commensurately . However, this would be counter productive as it would destabilize perspective planning and the economics of procurement. Therefore , the military has to necessarily evolve capabilities towards a projected "end-state" using a perspective planning horizon of say, 30 years, with revolutionary "intermediate-state" objectives developed in say, 10-year planning buckets. Each of these 10-year planning buckets may be further sub-divided into multiple stages. Remember that we are not talking maintaining legacy (read existing) war-fighting capabilities through its normal asset cycles.

The process is intended to combine the acquisition of new military systems with appropriate changes to doctrine and organization with a view to maximize the capabilities of the armed forces to deal with emergent or future threats.

However, there is a problem here. And the problem is that the spectrum of conflict is expanding at both ends. On one hand, while the threat of conventional or nuclear war at the high intensity end of the spectrum is seeing rapid strides in technology and geographic reach, those at the low end of short engagements, low intensity conflicts, insurgency, counter-terror, aid to civil authorities, special operations, conflict prevention, confrontation management and international stability (or peace-keeing) operations are increasing in both in variety and frequency.

Given this scenario, how is the government expected to jump-start this process? Of course, no one is saying that the MoD, in its current form, is capable of taking on any leadership role in this regard. So it may well be left to the good offices of single-service chiefs to take the initiative.


One possible way is through experimentation using existing agencies!

As a matter of fact, such agencies are already in place, like for example, the Army's ARTRAC, conceived as the nodal agency for all institutional training in the Army.

There are six main imperatives: (1) stimulate indigenous private sector R&D investments for technology development, (2) assess and articulate the "intermediate-state" and "end-state" capability objectives in each plan, (3) test the acquired capability through war gaming, exercises and operational deployments, where emergent, (4) evolve and test joint capabilities for permanent integration into strategic and theatre commands, (5) integrate and militarize all intelligence capabilities, and (6) professionalize the MoD and the executive advisory functions.

While acquiring indigenous technological capabilities are again a long term goal, and given the nebulous nature of  higher defence organization in India, single service chiefs can possibly initiate the process by adopting three immediate steps to stimulate the development of doctrine and organizational design, i.e., (1) invest in a variety of current off-the-shelf equipment in quantities suitable for attaining stage objectives and to seed indigenous R&D, (2) raise (through rationalization or re-appropriation) one or more experimental formations under their training commands to model stage capabilities (3) use project-based temporary structures to model and test joint doctrine and capability.

These future-state "incubators" will then serve as enablers for far-reaching changes in doctrine, concepts and organization, which together may well even generate fundamentally new ways of conducting military operations. This in turn will affect capital budgets and asset acquisition cycles, including many open and ongoing contracts and programs within the lifecycle of legacy assets. And at some critical point, the cumulative effects of technical advances and military innovation in all these areas will invalidate former conceptual structures and cause a fundamental alteration in accepted definitions and measurements of military effectiveness.

Such experimentation is not easy and in fact, has been even described as an "unnatural act" for any large, established organization. Moreover, these transformations do not come with any guarantees. Yet, it must be done right or at least, close to right, so that when the military is called to do something at some point in the future, it has the flexibility to adapt to its designated mission.


Single service experimental setup is feasible for all three services. Joint concepts and doctrines can be tested initially in experimental joint projects to gain trust and experience. Subsequently these temporary structures can be firmed up to create a fully integrated joint services experimental organization as a pre-cursor to joint theatre commands.

Any future force would have to be strategically responsive and dominant across a full spectrum of operations ranging from peacetime military engagement to smaller-scale contingencies to major theatre war. Given the rapidly changing geostrategic environment, strategic speed and lethality can no longer exist as separate variables.

All combat power is useless unless it can get to the specific theatre in time and maneuvre it tactically. Traditionally, heavy forces have had limited strategic mobility (read deployability) and light forces have had limited tactical utility. Any worthwhile transformation has to take care of this disconnect.

Of course, all this depends on the national policy concerning the future use of military force, which in the Indian context, has traditionally been passive, restrictive and poorly articulated. This decadence in military affairs, when combined with the lack of political leadership, the machinations of the civil bureaucracy and the dissonance created by other vested interests, has left a window of vulnerability in military capabilities, the true extent of which, luckily, has never been put to test.

The imperative of integrating the intelligence organizations derives from the expansion of conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum of operations. While operational capabilities remain prime, the burden shifts heavily to an effective intelligence framework.

Lastly, and of essential import to all other imperatives, is the pressing need to integrate and professionalize the MoD so that the transformation debate can mature from its focus on "equipment" to a holistic approach involving organizational, doctrinal and institutional change.



BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs by Dr David Jablonsky [Parameters, Autumn 1994]




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About this blog

This blog came about as a result of a recent article by a former colleague on the editorial page of the Times of India.

The article was on the imperatives of the development of airpower in the country in the context of the ongoing "hard-power" vs. "soft-power" debate and he bought up the topic of "smart power". He is of course, talking about a "transformation" in integrated thinking and capability development in the national security context. While I have to agree that most of the challenges lie in the task of educating our policy makers, a logical startpoint in the military security context (to get our house in order), would be the creation of a "joint services" doctrine. But with the office of the CDS hanging fire for several decades due to government apathy, bureaucratic dilettante and interservices rivalry, it will be a long while before it sees the light of day.

The Tri-Services National Defence Academy

However that does not mean that experimentation cannot start immediately. The very rationale of having a joint services training institutions right at the very start of an officer's service career was the notion of the integrated battlefield encompassing all its ramifications. The service chiefs today have been colleagues in the academy and maintain strong relationships right through their service career. There is no reason why this long standing camaraderie cannot be channeled towards more productive avenues than the ritual annual social events that marks the passing of yet another year since the POP.

Service Chiefs at the Republic Day function in 2012

In this blog I intend to explore the content and issues related to formulating a national security strategy and thereafter explore the linkages down through military strategy to domains like threat perceptions, force levels,  manpower planning, capital budgeting and higher defence organization, drawing mainly from a wealth of information from older western democracies where (at least in a relative way) such evolved thinking permeates the government and having matured over the years has now been substantially articulated in documentation available in the public domain.